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ABSTRACT
Congress often exercises control over appointments to federal office by writing job qualifications
and putting them directly into the statute creating the office. This practice is best examined by
viewing the Appointments Clause not as a single entity, but as two related clauses that set up two
very different methods of appointment: presidential nomination and Senate confirmation as the
default method, and vesting in one of three authorized appointers as an optional alternative
method for certain types of officers. When creating an office, Congress must choose one of these
methods for appointing the officer, but cannot create a hybrid method combining the two
procedures. In this Article, I examine the text, history, and structure of the Constitution to
determine what is required by each of the two appointments processes. I conclude that statutory
qualifications are consistent with the Constitution's process for vested appointments, but
inconsistent with the nomination and confirmation process.
INTRODUCTION
When a cabinet reorganization left the position of U.S. Trade
Representative open in 1996, President Clinton knew just whom he
wanted to appoint as the nation's chief trade negotiator. Charlene
Barshefsky had served as Deputy U.S. Trade Representative for three
years, and was widely praised as an accomplished and successful ne-
gotiator.' But the appointment, which requires the advice and con-
sent of the Senate,2 hit a snag: a federal statute required that the U.S.
Trade Representative be a person who has never "directly repre-
sented, aided, or advised a foreign entity ... in any trade negotiation,
* Prospective clerk to the Hon. Jerry E. Smith, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit;
J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, 2008. I would like to thank Will
Baude, Erik Durbin, Benjamin R. George, Marty Lederman, Saikrishna Prakash, Nicholas
Quinn Rosenkranz, Alexander Volokh, and Eugene Volokh for their extremely helpful
comments on drafts of this Article.
1 See Editorial, Clinton Wisely Fills a Cabinet Void, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 17, 1996, at N20 (calling
Barshefsky an "inside expert" and a "hard-nosed negotiator"); David E. Sanger, Major
Presidential Appointments, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1996, at All (noting Barshefsky's experi-
ence and successful past deals); Editorial, Three Good Appointments, WASH. POST, Apr. 13,
1996, at A20 (describing Barshefsky as "well prepared" to be U.S. Trade Representative,
and calling Clinton's nomination of her a "good choice[]").
2 See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2171(b)(1) (2004) (stating that U.S. Trade Representatives "shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate").
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or trade dispute, with the United States. 3 Barshefsky had previously
worked for the government of Canada. Clinton decided to nominate
her anyway and petitioned Congress to make an exception to the
statutory requirementi Congress did so, passing a private bill specifi-
6cally allowing the appointment of Charlene Barshefsky, by name,
and then confirming her nomination.7 The statutory requirement
remains in force for all future U.S. Trade Representatives.
Avoiding conflicts of interest from the person representing the
United States in negotiations is surely an important policy. But the
statutory qualifications prescribed in advance for the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative nearly prevented the most qualified individual from hold-
ing the job. The best time to evaluate the qualifications of an officer
who will be confirmed by the Senate is during the nomination and
confirmation process-not years or even decades before, when the
statute creating the office is written.
More important than the policy considerations, I will argue that
statutory requirements are unconstitutional for all appointments that
require the advice and consent of the Senate. Despite a long history
of statutory qualifications, the text and structure of the Appointments
Clause reveal that Congress is not authorized to limit who may hold
office in this way. Confirmation by the Senate, not statutory restric-
tions from the full Congress, is the process the Founders designed to
ensure responsible appointments of officers. Adding statutory quali-
fications to the mix can bar excellent people from holding office and
can also reduce the accountability of the President and Senate when
they make bad choices.
3 Id. § 2171 (b)(3).
4 See Paul Blustein, Clinton Expected To Name Barshefsky to Trade Post, WASH. POST, Nov. 14,
1996, at El ("Barshefsky advised the Canadian government in its dispute with the United
States over softwood lumber.").
5 See Clinton To Request Waiver for Barshefsky; Bill Sought To Exempt Her from Law Barring Nomi-
nation To Trade Post, J. COM., Dec. 19, 1996, at IA.
6 See Waiving Certain Provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 Relating to the Appointment of
the United States Trade Representative, Pub. L. No. 105-5, 111 Stat. 11, 11 (1997)
("[N]otwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (3) of section 141(b) of the Trade Act
of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2171(b) (3)) or any other provision of law, the President, acting by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, is authorized to appoint Charlene Barshefsky
as the United States Trade Representative.").
7 See U.S. Trade Official Wins Confirmation, and a Related Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,1997, at A20
("The Senate today confirmed Charlene Barshefsky as United States trade representa-
tive .. ").
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Not all statutory qualifications for officeholders are unconstitu-
tional, however.8 Appointment of inferior officers does not require
the advice and consent of the Senate. When creating an inferior of-
fice by statute, Congress can choose to keep the appointment within
the default advise and consent process, or it can vest the appointment
"in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of De-
partments."9 If Congress chooses to vest the appointment in one of
these appointing authorities, it may also create specific qualifications
for the officeholder in the statute. Because Senate confirmation is
not available to provide the check on power in these appointments, a
similar check can be provided by constraining the appointer's discre-
tion through statutory requirements. This result is consistent with
the text and structure of the Appointments Clause.
Congress has been writing job qualifications into statutes ever
since the Judiciary Act of 1789,'o and this practice is widely used to-
day." However, recent Presidents of both parties have argued that
some types of statutory qualifications unconstitutionally restrict the
President's appointment power. 1 These new arguments are
8 Several scholars have argued or suggested that all or most statutory qualifications are un-
constitutional constraints on the President's appointment powver. See Common Legisla-
tive Encroachments on Executive Branch Authority, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 248, 250
(1989) [hereinafter Common Legislative Encroachments] (arguing that statutory qualifi-
cations for principle officers are unconstitutional, but not stating an opinion about statu-
tory qualifications for inferior officers); Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Un-
derstanding of the Federal Appointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 467, 534-35
(1998) (arguing that statutory qualifications for inferior officers are unconstitutional, and
that statutory qualifications for principal officers are unconstitutional under a formalist
analysis but sometimes constitutional under a functionalist analysis); Donald J. Kochan,
The Unconstitutionality of Class-Based Statutory Limitations on Presidential Nominations: Can a
Man Head the Women's Bureau at the Department of Labor?, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43 (2005)
(arguing that all statutory qualifications for officeholders are unconstitutional); Note,
Congressional Restrictions on the President's Appointment Power and the Role of Longstanding
Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1914 (2007) [hereinafter Congres-
sional Restrictions] (arguing that statutory qualifications might be unconstitutional as an
original matter but have become legitimate through longstanding practice). Others have
focused on particular types of statutory qualifications, such as age, gender, or political
party requirements. See, e.g., Adam J. Rappaport, Comment, The Court of International
Trade's Political Party Diversity Requirement: Unconstitutional Under Any Separation of Powers
Theory, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1429 (2001) (arguing that the statutory requirement that no
more than five judges on the Court of International Trade be from the same political
party is unconstitutional).
9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
10 SeeJudiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93 (1789) (requiring that the Attorney General be
"learned in the law").
11 See infta notes 125-130 and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., Statement by President George W. Bush upon Signing H.R. 5441, Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act 2007, 42 WKLY. CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1742 (Oct. 4,
May 2008]
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strengthened by the fact that nobody in the earliest Congresses made
a principled argument that statutory qualifications are constitutional.
Instead, they largely ignored the issue. Despite the longstanding
practice of attaching statutory qualifications, the issue of their consti-
tutionality remains very much alive.
In Part I of this Article, I closely read the text of the Appointments
Clause and articulate important differences between the two proc-
esses for appointing officers. These differences reveal that Congress
acting as a whole does not have a role in the appointment of officers
who require Senate confirmation. But the Constitution states in rela-
tively straightforward language that Congress can prescribe qualifica-
tions for the appointment of officers who will not be confirmed by
the Senate.
In Part II, I trace the history of the Appointments Clause from the
drafting of the Constitution through the modern era. Finally, in Part
III, I discuss structural features of the Appointments Clause that cre-
ate accountability and prevent abuse of the appointment power.
I. THE TWO APPOINTMENTS CLAUSES
The Appointments Clause does not set out a single process for
appointing federal officers. Instead, it creates two distinct processes
and provides guidelines about when each process should be used.
The text of the Appointments Clause reads as follows:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law
vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in
the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Depart-
14ments.
The two appointments processes lead to different requirements
that are not apparent on first glance. It is important to separate them
from the outset and note their different features.
2006) [hereinafter Bush Statement on H.R. 5441] (noting that a section of the bill may
unconstitutionally limit the President's appointment power by imposing a statutory quali-
fication); Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing S. 1060, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1907 (Dec. 19, 1995) (pointing out constitutional limits on Congress's ability to interfere
with the President's appointment power by writing statutory qualifications).
13 See infra notes 114-124 and accompanying text.
14 U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
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In the first process, which must be used for appointments of prin-
cipal officers, the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint" the officer. 5 I will re-
fer to this clause as the Confirmation Appointments Clause and to
appointments using this process as confirmation appointments.6  The
Constitution specifies that this process can be used to appoint "Am-
bassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appoint-
ments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be es-
tablished by Law."
7
In the second process, "Congress may by Law vest the Appoint-
ment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."'" I will
refer to this clause as the Vested Appointments Clause and to appoint-
ments using this process as vested appointments. The Constitution ex-
plicitly makes vested appointments available only for inferior officers,
but it is not mandatory in any case. All officers could be appointed
through the confirmation appointments process at Congress's discre-
tion.
Much ink has been spilled over the question of which officers are
"inferior" and can be appointed through the Vested Appointments
Clause.' 9 That debate is extremely interesting. But for purposes of
15 Id.; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (per curiam) ("Principal officers are
selected by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate."); Walter Dellinger,
The Constitutional Separation of Powers Bet ween the President and Congress, 63 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 514, 539-40 (noting that advice and consent of the Senate is needed for the ap-
pointment of principal officers).
16 There is no name for this clause of the Constitution that is as yet widely accepted in the
literature. Some people, especially within the executive branch, refer to this appoint-
ment process as "PAS" (President with Advice of the Senate). See, e.g., Guidance on Ap-
plication of Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 1999 WL 1262050 (Off. Legal Coun-
sel) (Mar. 22, 1999) ("[A]ppointment is required to be made by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate (a 'PAS position').").
17 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
18 Id.
19 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) ("The line between 'inferior' and
'principal' officers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided little guidance
into where it should be drawn."); Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the
Appointments Clause, 2007 WL 1292268 (Off. Legal Counsel) (April 16, 2007), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/2007/appointmentsclausevIO.pdf ("[T] he only question be-
ing whether the counsel was a principal or inferior officer."); 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1536, at 362-63 (3d ed. 1858) ("In the practical
course of the government there does not seem to have been any exact line drawn, who
are and who are not to be deemed inferior officers, in the sense of the Constitution, whose
appointment does not necessarily require the concurrence of the Senate."); Akhil Reed
May 2008]
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this Article, the more important distinction is between, on the one
hand, offices that Congress has (presumably properly) decided to fill
through vested appointments, and on the other hand, those offices
that Congress has kept within the confirmation appointments process
(because they are either principal offices that must use this process or
inferior offices for which Congress has not chosen to allow vested ap-
pointments).
These two sections of the Appointments Clause set out fairly de-
tailed procedures for appointing different types of federal officers.
When the Constitution specifies detailed procedures, those proce-
dures should be carefully followed.2° Detailed procedures suggest
that the result is either the outcome of a compromise among differ-
ent factions or a carefully structured set of checks and balances, if not
both. 1
If the procedures in the Appointments Clause are the result of a
compromise among the Framers, that means there is no underlying
principle that can be given greater force through a broad interpreta-
tion of the provision.22 The written provision is an accommodation of
several competing principles, and the only faithful reading of the text
is to enforce the compromise as written.2 The notes from the Consti-
tutional Convention and historical scholarship on the issue shows
that this is exactly what happened, and that the Appointments Clause
is a compromise between competing political views rather than an
outgrowth of a shared political theory. 4
If a procedure embodies a careful set of checks and balances, de-
viating from the procedure upsets the Framers' intended allocation
Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 804-09 (1999) (arguing that an officer is in-
ferior if she is "subordinate to a superior officer or entity"); Dellinger, supra note 15, at
539-41 (arguing that in determining whether an officer is an inferior officer, "the most
important issues are the extent of the officer's discretion to make autonomous policy
choices and the location of the powers to supervise and to remove the officer").
20 See generally John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitu-
tional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1665 (2004) ("[W]hen the Court confronts a precise and
detailed constitutional text, it should adhere closely to the prescribed solution rather
than stretch or contract the text in light of the apparent ratio legis.").
21 See id. at 1737 ("[W]hen an adopted text establishes a new power and takes care to specify
the mode of its exercise, our tradition is to treat such a specification as presumptively ex-
clusive. Otherwise, why would a lawmaking body take the trouble to spell out often
elaborate procedures for exercising a grant of power if alternative procedures would do
just as well?").
22 See id. at 1690-91.
23 See id. at 1702-03.
24 See infra notes 93-109.
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of power between the branches of government.1 The Framers in-
tended to place power to act in one constitutional actor and the abil-
ity to check that power in certain ways in another. Construing away
the checks might let one power run rampant. Adding more checks
also disrupts the constitutional structure and may leave the primary
actor too little discretion to make appropriate choices. It could also
create gridlock that prevents important actions from getting accom-
plished.
The two procedures are completely separate. Congress cannot
pick and choose aspects of each process and combine them into a
new process any more than it could create a new process without ref-
26erence to the Constitution. 6 Changing the process even subtly, or
changing the order in which steps of the process happen, can dra-
matically change the outcomes of the process. 1 To remain faithful to
the constitutional plan, therefore, it is imperative that Congress and
the President decide in each case which appointments procedure is
being used and then follow the requirements for that procedure.
The primary evidence for these procedural requirements is in the
text of the Constitution itself.
A. Confirmation Appointments
The Confirmation Appointments Clause is itself composed of two
parts. First, the President "shall nominate" people for offices.s Sec-
ond, the President, "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Sen-
ate, shall appoint" officers. 29 The requirements of each part must be
analyzed separately. The text indicates that Congress cannot place
statutory limits on the President's ability to nominate officers, and
that statutory qualifications do not constitute post-nomination advice
and consent of the Senate.
25 See Manning, supra note 20, at 1711-12 (pointing out that many provisions in the Consti-
tution prescribe detailed procedures for exercising government powers); id. at 1712
n.179 (presenting the Appointments Clause as an example of a detailed constitutional
procedure that has been strictly construed).
26 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,127 (1976) (per curiam) ("[T]here is no provision of the
Constitution remotely providing any alternative means [of appointment] for the selection
of the members of the Commission or for anybody like them.").
27 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. &John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 CEO.
L.J. 523 (1992) (exploring the policy results of different legislative and agency review
procedures); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Vot-
ing Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions, 28 AM.J. POL. SCI. 49 (1984) (analyz-
ing cyclical voting preferences).
28 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
29 Id
May 2008]
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1. Nomination vs. Appointment
Under the Confirmation Appointments Clause, the President
holds the sole power of nominating people to federal offices. After
the nomination, the Senate must consent to the nominee before the
President may appoint her to office.)° The Constitution thus limits
the President's discretion in appointment, but not in nomination.
Most statutory qualifications are limitations on the President's ap-
pointment power, but some of them explicitly or implicitly limit his
nomination power as well." In particular, provisions that require the
President to select a nominee from a short list of candidates put for-
ward by someone else significantly constrict the President's nomina-
tion power. 2
The text of the Appointments Clause makes a firm distinction be-
tween the power of nomination and the power of appointment. The
nomination power is given to the President alone, but the actual ap-
pointment power is shared with the Senate.3 The President "shall
appoint" officers only "by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate,"34 but he "shall nominate" officers without any qualifying lan-
30 Appointment to office is not automatic after the Senate has consented to the President's
nominee. The President may choose not to appoint the nominee even if the Senate con-
sents. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 72 (4th
ed. 1957); John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation
Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 639 (1993) (empha-
sizing that the Senate's role is entirely advisory and the President is solely accountable for
the appointment).
31 In his dissent in Myers v. United States, Justice Brandeis characterized all statutory qualifica-
tions as limits on the President's nomination power, not the appointment power. See 272
U.S. 52, 265 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[A] multitude of laws have been enacted
which limit the President's power to make nominations, and which, through the restric-
tions imposed, may prevent the selection of the person deemed by him best fitted.").
32 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2000) (establishing appointment of the Comptroller General
and Deputy Comptroller General by the President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, from a list of three or more individuals prepared by a nominating commis-
sion); District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-198, § 433(a), 87 Stat. 774, 795 (1973) ("[T]he President shall nominate, from
the list of persons recommended to him by the District of Columbia Judicial Nomination
Commission .... and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint all
judges of the District of Columbia courts.").
33 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See also Myers, 272 U.S. at 264-65 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) ("There is not a word in the Constitution which in terms authorizes Congress to
limit the President's freedom of choice in making nominations for executive offices. It is
to appointment as distinguished from nomination that the Constitution imposes in terms
the requirement of Senatorial consent.").
34 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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guage at all.3 5 As John McGinnis cleverly puts it, "the act of nomina-
tion is separated from the act of appointment by a comma and a con-
junction. 36  Justice Kennedy has referred to the Appointments
Clause-apparently without irony-as a model of constitutional clar-
ity.
37
The President's decision of whom to nominate is widely regarded
as his choice alone.3s Neither the Senate in its advice and consent
role nor the Congress as a whole through its legislative power can
prescribe the individual to hold an office.39 It is uncontroversial that
the President must have considerable discretion to choose a person
he thinks will perform the duties of an office well.4°
35 Id. Professors Strauss and Sunstein claim that the Senate's advice should be given before
nomination and consent should be given after, but they provide no support for this asser-
tion and the text of the Constitution seems to plainly disprove it. See David A. Strauss &
Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J.
1491, 1494-95 (1992).
36 McGinnis, supra note 30, at 638.
37 See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 487 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) ("The Appointments Clause sets out the respective powers of the Executive and
Legislative Branches with admirable clarity."). But seeJohn M. Burkoff, Appointment and
Removal Under the Federal Constitution: The Impact of Buckley v. Valeo, 22 WAYNE L. REV.
1335, 1336 (1976) ("The Framers of the Constitution were guilty of their usual delphic
clarity in denominating the various strata of government personnel and the concommi-
tant [sic] mode of appointment.").
38 See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 483 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("No role whatsoever is
given either to the Senate or to Congress as a whole in the process of choosing the person
who will be nominated for appointment."); id. at 487 ("The President has the sole re-
sponsibility for nominating.., officials... ."); THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (Alexander Ham-
ilton) (explaining that the President alone will nominate); Jay S. Bybee, Advising the Presi-
dent: Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 104 YALE LJ. 51, 108-09
(1994) (arguing that even a requirement that the President consult with an advisory body
before nominating someone to office is unconstitutional); Kochan, supra note 8, at 53
("The President must have full control of, and accountability for, his exercise of the
nomination power granted to him in the Constitution."); McGinnis, supra note 30, at 639
("[The Framers] gave the undiluted power of the nomination to the President so that the
initiative of choice would be a single individual's responsibility ... ").
39 See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 483 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("No role whatsoever is
given either to the Senate or to Congress as a whole in the process of choosing the person
who will be nominated for appointment."); Civil Service Commission, 13 Op. Att'y Gen.
516, 520 (1871) [hereinafter Civil Service Commission] ("A legal obligation to follow the
judgment of [a nominating board] is inconsistent with the constitutional independence
of the appointing power."); CORWIN, supra note 30, at 74 ("[T]he proposition is univer-
sally conceded that some choice, however small, must be left the appointing authority.").
40 See Civil Service Commission, supra note 39, at 525 (arguing that statutory qualifications
for officeholders must leave the appointing power with "a reasonable scope for its own
judgment and will"); Constitutionality of Statute Governing Appointment of United
States Trade Representative, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 279 (1996) [hereinafter U.S.
Trade Rep. Opinion] (stating that in the opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel, 19
U.S.C. § 2171(b) (3), which barred the appointment of Barshefsky as U.S. Trade Repre-
May 2008]
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The President's discretion to appoint officers is constrained by the
Senate's advice and consent role. But his power to nominate is not
limited under the Constitution. The nomination power is simply a
power of recommending a potential officeholder to the Senate. The
Constitution also requires the President to "recommend to [Con-
gress's] Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient."41 It would be unconstitutional for Congress to pass a law
prohibiting the President from recommending certain kinds of legis-
lation.2 Similarly, the President's power to nominate people to office
cannot be limited by law. This does not mean the Senate should
necessarily be deferential to the President's choice of nominees any
more so than to the President's proposed legislation. a But it does
place the President squarely in the position of first mover in suggest-
ing a nominee without statutory constraints.
Nothing, of course, restricts the President's ability to voluntarily
confer with Senators or others before he makes a nomination. The
practice of "senatorial courtesy," for example, has historically led
Presidents to defer to Senators about choosing nominees for posi-
tions in the Senators' home states. 4 Some scholars have called for
greater consultation between the President and the Senate at the
45nomination stage. I take no position on whether these arrange-
ments are wise as matters of policy, but simply note that such volun-
tary consultation raises no constitutional questions.
sentative until the private exemption was passed, is unconstitutional because of the wide
discretion given to the President under the Appointment Clause of the Constitution);
Gerhardt, supra note 8, at 535 ("Functional analysis would likely [allow statutory qualifica-
tions for most offices] because the president would still have considerable latitude to
choose nominees from within the set of nominees qualified under the legislative re-
quirements."). But see generally Congressional Restrictions, supra note 8 (arguing that long-
standing acquiescence in a limitation of the nomination power saves that limit from un-
constitutionality).
41 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
42 See generallyJ. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO L.J. 2079, 2118-28 (1989)
(arguing that laws prohibiting the President from attempting changes in policy violate
the Recommendation Clause).
43 See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1494 (arguing that an important part of checks
and balances is Congress's right to disagree with the President).
44 See, e.g., CORWIN, supra note 30, at 73-74 (explaining that the Senate is able to exert great
influence on the President's nominations through the practice of senatorial courtesy);
Gerhardt, supra note 8, at 529-31 (describing the influence senatorial courtesy has ex-
erted over most Presidents). See also Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1501 (recount-
ing examples of Presidents following Senate advice about Supreme Court nominations).
45 See, e.g., Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1514-16 (arguing that a stronger Senate role
in influencing the President's choice of Supreme Court nominees would increase the
quality ofjustices who are confirmed).
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Most statutory requirements on officeholders place no legal re-
straint on whom the President may nominate to the office, only on
whom he may appoint. In the face of a statutory requirement that
would prevent his preferred nominee from holding office, the Presi-
dent might stubbornly decide to nominate his candidate anyway46 and
leave it to the Senate to decide whether to ignore the statutory re-
quirement and confirm the nominee, 47 amend the statute to allow the
4oinominee to be appointed , or reject the nominee. Since there is a
constitutional distinction between nomination and appointment,
nominating someone who does not meet the requirements for ap-
pointment is consistent with the President's obligation to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed."
49
2. "Advice and Consent"
Statutory qualifications are no more constitutional if they are
viewed solely as a limit on the President's power to appoint, not his
power to nominate. Some people argue that statutory qualifications
are an exercise of the Senate's power to give "Advice and Consent"
before the President can appoint a nominee to office.5° However, the
text of the Constitution strongly suggests that advice and consent
must be given after the President chooses a nominee, not before. Any
binding advice and consent also must come from the Senate alone,
not the House of Representatives and Senate acting together, as is
necessary to pass a statute.
46 President Clinton took this route when he nominated Charlene Barshefsky to be United
States Trade Representative. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
47 This result would put to the President the further choice of whether to violate the explicit
terms of the statute by appointing the confirmed nominee. If he believed the statutory
restriction to be unconstitutional, he could refuse to follow the requirement. See generally
Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2000). Some scholars argue that refusal to execute unconsti-
tutional laws is a duty of the President, not a discretionary power. See Saikrishna Prakash,
The President's Duty To Disregard Unconstitutional "Laws," 96 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming June
2008). In the context of statutory qualifications for officeholders, Prakash's view would
require the President to nominate and appoint his preferred choice for the office regard-
less of whether that person met the statutory requirements.
48 Amending the statute would of course require the agreement of the House of Represen-
tatives. See infra Part III.D for a discussion of the House of Representatives' role in ap-
pointments and statutory qualifications.
49 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
50 See, e.g., FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (describing a
statutory restriction on officeholders as an exercise of the Senate's advice and consent
power).
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The Constitution does not specify whether the Senate's advice
should be given before or after the nomination, but the text suggests
that it should be after. Advice also connotes a non-binding recom-
mendation and therefore cannot be implemented through a legally
binding statutory requirement. The word "Consent," while it does
connote a binding decision, also strongly points to a post-nomination
process rather than a pre-nomination one.
The Senate's advice and consent role is attached to the appoint-
ment power, not the nomination power. This can be illustrated by a
comparison of the Appointments Clause with the Treaty Clause. Like
the Appointments Clause, the Treaty Clause is also specified in two
separate steps in the Constitution. 5' First, the President can "make
Treaties"; second, the Senate must "concur.0 2 But unlike the Ap-
pointments Clause, the Treaty Clause requires Senate involvement at
both steps. Indeed, the parallel "Advice and Consent" clause is at-
tached to the first step in the process: "[The President] shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur., 53 At-
taching the advice and consent role to only the second step in the Ap-
pointments Clause thus differentiates it from the treaty power and
strongly suggests that advice and consent are not required at the
nomination stage.
The word "advice" means a recommendation, not a binding re-
quirement. The meaning of the word has not changed significantly
since the time of the Founding. The 1828 edition of Noah Webster's
American Dictionary of the English Language defined "advice" as
"[c] ounsel; an opinion recommended, or offered, as worthy to be fol-
lowed. 5 4 Similarly, a more modern edition of Webster's dictionary
defines it as a "recommendation regarding a decision or course of
conduct." 5-" Black's Law Dictionary shows that the legal meaning of the
word is not significantly different. 56 None of these definitions suggest
51 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur...
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828), available at
http://1828.mshaffer.com/d/search/word,advice.
55 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 32 (1971) (third definition) [herein-
after WEBSTER'S THIRD].
56 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 59 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "advice" as "[g]uidance offered by
one person, esp. a lawyer, to another"). See also id. (defining "advice and consent" as
"generally includ[ing] the right to vote on approval of an appointment").
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that the advice given by the Senate regarding appointments can be
binding on the President.
The executive branch has long recognized the difference between
non-binding advice and binding legal requirements on appoint-
ments. Advice may be given by the Senate or other advisory bodies,
but it is merely a recommendation and cannot constrain the Presi-
dent's choice. 57 The President routinely consults with Senators and
others about judicial and other appointments. 5s Such consultation is
politically useful and, since it is non-binding, constitutionally unprob-
lematic.
The Senate's role in advising the President on appointments thus
cannot justify setting binding requirements by statute in advance.
The Senate's role in consenting to the appointment of an official also
does not allow statutory requirements for officeholders. The Presi-
dent may not appoint an official without the consent of the Senate.
But the text suggests that this consent must be given after the Presi-
dent chooses his nominee, not before.
Like the definition of "advice," the definition of "consent" has not
changed much since the Constitution was written. In 1828, Webster's
dictionary defined "consent" as "[a]greement of the mind to what is
proposed or state[d] by another; accord. 50  Today, the definition is
"compliance or approval esp. of what is done or proposed by an-
other., 6° These definitions share an understanding of consent as the
approval of a proposal that has already been put forward by someone
else. In the Appointments Clause context, that conforms to the tradi-
tional understanding that the President should nominate an individ-
ual for office, and then the Senate should consent (or decline to con-
sent) to the appointment of that individual.
57 Civil Service Commission, supra note 39, at 520 ("The appointing power may avail itself of
the judgment of others as one means of information.... I see no constitutional objection
to an examining board, rendering no imperative judgments, but only aiding the appoint-
ing power with information. A legal obligation to follow the judgment of [someone else]
is inconsistent with the constitutional independence of the appointing power.").
58 See Yvette M. Barksdale, Advise and Consent, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1399, 1404 (1997)
(describing the role played by the Senate's responsibility to advise and consent); supra
note 44 and accompanying text.
59 NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828), available at
http://1828.mshaffer.com/d/search/word,consent.
60 WEBSTER'S THIRD, supra note 55 at 482. "Consent" is also a legal term of art with special
meaning in tort law. Legal definitions of "consent" for tort law do not contradict the
meaning in common usage, but they also do not have any special relevance to the under-
standing of the word in this constitutional context. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 56, at 323 (defining "consent" as "[a]greement, approval, or permission as to some
act or purpose, esp. given voluntarily by a competent person; legally effective assent").
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"Consenting" by statute prior to the announcement of a nominee
fits awkwardly into these definitions. Until the President announces
his nominee, there is no proposal to which the Senate may consent.
The statute is also probably the product of an earlier Senate, so it may
not even express the opinion of the current Senate. And regardless
of the statute, the Senate also retains its power to consent or withhold
consent after the President has chosen a nominee. Thus a statutory
qualification is not a form of advance consent to an appointment.
A statutory qualification might be seen not as binding, but instead
as an advance warning of the qualifications that the Senate will later
demand of an officeholder during the advice and consent process."
But under the "advance warning" reading, statutory qualifications for
officeholders are probably just advisory, not binding the Senate to
consent to a nominee nor constraining the President in whom he
may appoint.
Advisory qualifications, even if enacted in statute, pose no consti-
tutional problems. However, since the statutory provisions generally
are written in language that appears mandatory,62 the "advance warn
ing" reading is difficult to defend.63
Statutory qualifications are further problematic because they do
not reflect the opinion of the Senate alone. To enact a statute, the
61 See, e.g., FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("It is not the
law ... which arguably restrains the President, but his perception of the present Senate's
view as it may be assumed to be reflected in the statute.").
62 See, e.g., 6 U.S.C.A. § 313(c) (2) (2007) ("The Administrator [of FEMA] shall be appointed
from among individuals who have ... a demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emer-
gency management and homeland security; and ... not less than 5 years of executive
leadership and management experience in the public or private sector." (emphasis
added)); An Act to Establish a Court of Private Land Claims, and to Provide for the Set-
tlement of Private Land Claims in Certain States and Territories, 51 Cong. Ch. 539, § 226
Stat. 854, 855 (1891) [hereinafter Private Land Claims] ("And there shall be appointed by
the said court a person who shall be when appointed a citizen and resident of some State of
the United States, skilled in the Spanish and English languages, to act as interpreter and
translator in said court ... " (emphasis added)); An Act to Incorporate the Inhabitants
of the City of Washington, in the District of Columbia, 7 Cong. Ch. 53, § 5, 2 Stat. 195,
196 (1802) ("[The mayor of D.C.] must bea citizen of the United States, and a resident of
the city, prior to his appointment." (emphasis added)).
63 Despite the apparently mandatory language of statutory provisions, Presidents have some-
times construed them as advisory. See, e.g., Bush statement on H.R. 5441, supra note 12
("Section 503(c)(2) vests in the President authority to appoint the Administrator [of
FEMA], by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, but purports to limit the quali-
fications of the pool of persons from whom the President may select the appointee in a
manner that rules out a large portion of those persons best qualified by experience and
knowledge to fill the office. The executive branch shall construe section 503(c)(2) in a
manner consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.").
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cooperation of both houses of Congress and the President is re-
quired.64  Any statute thus represents a compromise between the
opinions of the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the Presi-
dent.65 Any qualifications for officeholders that come out of the con-
cerns of the House of Representatives cannot be binding, because
only the President and Senate have constitutionally prescribed roles
in the appointment process.
B. Vested Appointments
The Vested Appointments Clause creates a process entirely sepa-
rate from the Confirmation Appointments Clause. Limits on vested
appointments therefore require a separate analysis from limits on
confirmation appointments. The Vested Appointments Clause pro-
vides that "the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such in-
ferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."'"
This clause, unlike the Confirmation Appointments Clause, allows
Congress to mandate statutory qualifications for officeholders. Statu-
tory qualifications, therefore, are only appropriate for vested ap-
pointments, not confirmation appointments.
1. Congress and Law
The first thing to notice is that the Vested Appointments Clause
creates a role for Congress, not the Senate acting alone. In contrast to
the Confirmation Appointments Clause, the House of Representa-
tives does have a role in vested appointments.
The Vested Appointments Clause also explicitly provides that the
power of appointment can be vested "by Law." This language incor-
porates the Article I, Section 7 process for creating a law, which re-
quires the concurrence of both the House and Senate as well as pre-
sentment to the President.67  Subjecting the power of vested
appointment to statutes created by Congress is in stark contrast to the
64 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
65 Cf Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Condorcet and the Constitution: A Response to The Law of
Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1281, 1295 (2007) (pointing out that in our constitutional
system, the House and Senate ask subtly but importantly different questions when con-
sidering the same bill).
66 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
67 See id. art. I, § 7; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (calling the bicameralism and
presentment process a "finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure" and hold-
ing that it is the only way to create binding laws).
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confirmation appointments process, which, in requiring "the Advice
and Consent of the Senate," is non-statutory and only vaguely de-
finedi6
2. "As they think proper"
The Vested Appointments Clause contains one of those most
dreaded, but most common, of constitutional ambiguities: the con-
fusing comma.69 Recall, the clause reads as follows:
[B]ut the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Of-
ficers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments. 70
The phrase "as they think proper," set off by commas on both
ends, has at least two possible meanings. The phrase could be read to
modify the verb "vest," meaning that Congress has the power, when-
ever and however it thinks proper, to vest appointment of an inferior
officer in the President. 1 Alternatively, the phrase could be read to
modify the noun phrase "such inferior Officers," making it part of the
phrase "such. .. as." Both readings affirmatively permit statutory
qualifications.
A note before beginning this close textual reading: English
grammar and punctuation were not highly standardized in the eight-
eenth century. The use of commas could be particularly idiosyn-
68 The Confirmation Appointments Clause requires that appointments for "other Officers"
be "established by Law," but this refers to the creation of the office, not the vesting of ap-
pointment power. See, e.g., Limitations on Presidential Power to Create a New Executive
Branch Entity to Receive and Administer Funds under Foreign Aid Legislation, 9 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 76, 77-78 (1985) [hereinafter Limitations on Presidential Power] ("That
the Constitution distinguishes between the creation of an office and appointment thereto
for the generality of national offices has never been questioned. The former is by
law .... [T]he President or heads of... agencies select individuals to fill those posi-
tions.").
69 See generally Peter Jeremy Smith, Commas, Constitutional Grammar, and the Straight-Face Test:
What if Conan the Grammarian Were a Strict Textualist?, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 7 (1999) (de-
tailing various Constitutional ambiguities caused by misplaced commas); David Yassky,
The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588,
617 n.116 (2000) (discussing the unusual commas in the Second Amendment); Posting
of Kurt Paulsen to Property Professor Blog, The West Wing, the Takings Clause and Tom
Merrill, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/property/2006/05/the-west-wing-t.htm
(May 11, 2006) (discussing the comma ambiguity in the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause that was featured on an episode of The West Wing).
70 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
71 For convenience, I will refer to appointments being vested in the President, though they
could equally be vested in "the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." Id. art.
11, § 2, cl. 2.
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cratic.72 Removing some or all of the commas from an ambiguous
sentence can therefore shed light on possible meanings that might be
obscured by modern punctuation conventions. I have removed
commas from the constitutional text throughout this section where
doing so can highlight a different reading.
The first possible reading, in which Congress may "vest... as they
think proper," places strong discretion in Congress to determine
when and in what manner to vest the appointment of inferior offi-
cers. Congress might think it proper to vest an appointment while
constraining the appointer's discretion through statutory qualifica-
tions. Thus, the Vested Appointments Clause on this reading gives
affirmative power to Congress to attach statutory qualifications to
vested appointments.
The phrase "as they think proper" might seem superfluous if it is
read to describe Congress's power to vest appointments. The Consti-
tution already specifies that "Congress may ... vest the Appoint-
ment." But the addition of "as they think proper" could indicate that
the decision of whether and in what way to vest an appointment is a
political question committed to Congress and not subject to judicial
review.
7 3
The second possible reading of "as they think proper" is an even
stronger endorsement of Congress's power to place statutory qualifi-
cations for vested appointments. On this reading, "such inferior Of-
ficers" means those officers "as [Congress] think[s] proper." That is,
the phrase gives Congress further discretion about the officers them-
selves, not about the vesting of appointment power.
Other clauses in the Constitution use the "such ... as" locution.
Two of these are particularly parallel to the Appointments Clause be-
cause they also include a delegation of power to a specific constitu-
tional actor to make decisions as he "think[s] proper." First is the
President's power to adjourn Congress. That clause reads: "[I]n
Case of Disagreement between [the houses of Congress], with Re-
72 One popular grammar textbook of the era does not even mention the word "comma," let
alone provide instructions for its proper use. SeeJOSEPH PRIESTLEY, THE RUDIMENTS OF
ENGLISH GRAMMAR, ADAPTED TO THE USE OF SCHOOLS; WITH EXAMPLES OF ENGLISH
COMPOSITION (1789). Those grammar guides that did discuss the use of commas were as
much or more concerned with pauses and voice inflection when reading the sentence
aloud than with the grammatical function served by the comma. See, e.g., ROBERT LOWTH,
A SHORT INTRODUCION TO ENGLISH GRAMMAR 157-72 (1762).
73 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (holding that a political question exists when
there is "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department").
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spect to the Time of Adjournment, [the President] may adjourn
them to such Time as he shall think proper. ... "" The phrase "such
Time as he shall think proper" is a grant of authority to the President
to determine the time when Congress shall reconvene.
The second parallel clause is the Slave Trade Clause: "The Migra-
tion or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Con-
gress. ... " This delegated authority to then-existing states to con-
tinue the slave trade by importing "such persons as ... [they] think
proper.
Under a reading analogous to the Adjournment and Slave Trade
Clauses, the Constitution explicitly allows Congress to impose qualifi-
cations for inferior officers by statute: "Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers[ ] as they think proper[] in the
President alone .... In other words, Congress may pass statutes
specifying what types of people it thinks are proper to hold the offices
it creates, and then vest the President with the authority to appoint
such people to office. These statutory qualifications are binding on
the President-anyone appointed who does not meet the qualifica-
tions is illegally in office.
However the Vested Appointments Clause is read, it grants discre-
tion to Congress to impose statutory qualifications for vested ap-
pointments. This textual commitment further calls into question the
propriety of statutory qualifications for confirmation appointments,
because the Constitution is silent on that issue.
C. The Necessary and Proper Clause
The Necessary and Proper Clause" does not give Congress the
power to create statutory qualifications for confirmation appoint-
ments. Congress has the power to create offices whenever those of-
fices are necessary and proper to carrying out executive or judicial
functions, but the Necessary and Proper Clause does not extend to
74 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
75 Id. art. I, § 9. The Slave Trade Clause is, of course, no longer in force, but it provides an
example of language usage at the time of the Founding.
76 Id. art. II, § 2.
77 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("Congress shall have Power... [t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any De-
partment or Officer thereof.").
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prescribing qualifications for the people who are appointed to hold
those offices.8
Congress is not granted any new powers by the Necessary and
Proper Clause. The clause only prescribes reasonable means-
passing laws-that further ends already established in other parts of• • 79
the Constitution. It does not change the allocation of powers be-
tween the legislature and the executive.8 0 And it does not allow Con-
gress to create new procedures that supersede ones specified in the
Constitution itself s'
The Constitution assigns the power of nomination for a confirma-
tion appointment to the President alone, 2 and it allocates the power
of confirmation appointments to the President together with the
Senate. Congress can pass laws that are necessary and proper to help
the President and Senate carry out those functions, such as establish-
ing an agency to help identify and evaluate potential nominees. 3 But
constraining an executive power is not something that is "necessary
and proper for carrying [it] into Execution."8'4 Thus, Congress can-
not require that the President limit his nominees to a specific group
of individuals named by someone else, or constrain appointments to
78 Cf Rosenkranz, supra note 65, at 1883 n.72 ("The Treaty Clause individually confers im-
portant power of course, and the Necessary and Proper Clause presumptively does too.
But there is no reason to assume that the combination of the two clauses confers any ad-
ditional power." (citation omitted)). Congress's power to prescribe statutory qualifica-
tions for officers whose appointments are vested in the President or another person de-
rives not from the Necessary and Proper Clause, but from the text of the Vested
Appointments Clause itself. See supra Part I.B.
79 See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541, 591 (1994) ("The Necessary and Proper Clause... is centrally con-
cerned with means and takes the Constitution's vesting of powers as a given.").
80 See id. at 591 ("Simply put, the Clause has nothing to do with altering constitutionally
granted powers and prerogatives; nor does it allow Congress to tell constitutionally em-
powered actors how they can implement their exclusive powers.").
81 See Manning, supra note 20, at 1737-38 ("[D]espite its general powers under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, Congress... cannot prescribe a method of appointing 'Officers
of the United States' different from the specific methods laid out in the carefully drawn
terms of the Appointments Clause.").
82 See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text (describing the President's clear grant of
constitutional authority to nominate).
83 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 79, at 591 ("Congress [could] institute an agency to
help the President wisely employ his pardoning power, or ... establish a department to
assist the President in selecting officers for nomination."). The Office of Legal Policy in
the Department ofJustice currently fills this role. SeeAbout OLP, http://www.usdoj.gov/
olp/history.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2008) (discussing the history of the Office of Legal
Policy).
84 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 79, at 591-92 (analyzing the
Necessary and Proper Clause in relation to the vesting power of Congress).
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people who meet a particular set of qualifications, for confirmation
appointments.
85
Even for those who take a broader reading of the Necessary and
86Proper Clause, there are good reasons to think Congress's power in
confirmation appointments is limited. Some scholars see the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause as giving Congress the ability to check presi-
dential powers, or as allowing Congress to regulate presidential pow-
ers that do not themselves serve as checks on Congress. s7
This checks-and-balances approach should give pause when the
Constitution specifically and carefully balances power among gov-
ernmental actors for a particular function. The usual separation of
powers struggle involves the President's enumerated or implied pow-
ers on the one hand, versus Congress's powers to legislate and con-
trol appropriations on the other hand. In appointments, however,
the Constitution specifically took the issue out of the ordinary checks-
and-balances framework. Instead, the Framers chose to create a dif-
ferent balance of power: the Constitution carefully apportions ap-
pointment power between the President and Senate for confirmation
appointments. Adding legislation to this mix alters the careful proc-
ess the Constitution sets up. Congress should not be able to interfere
with a power specifically designated to other constitutional actors.
Congress does have the power to create offices. But this power
does not include the power to legislatively interfere with the Presi-
dent's power of appointment to those offices.88 Statutory qualifica-
85 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 79, at 591 ("Congress could not require that the Presi-
dent consult with the leadership of Congress before he vetoes a bill.").
86 See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, The Lamentable Notion of Indefeasible Presidential Powers: A Reply to
Professor Prakash, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1383 (2006).
87 See, e.g., id. at 1396-1400 (arguing that maintaining checks and balances requires a non-
absolutist view of the division between executive and legislative powers).
88 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 135 (1975) (per curiam) ("Congress could not, merely
because it concluded that such a measure was 'necessary and proper' to the discharge of
its substantive legislative authority, pass a bill of attainder or ex post facto law contrary to
the prohibitions contained in § 9 of Art. I. No more may it vest in itself, or in its officers,
the authority to appoint officers of the United States when the Appointments Clause by
clear implication prohibits it from doing so."); id. at 275 (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("Congress clearly has the power to create federal offices and to
define the powers and duties of those offices, but no case in this Court even remotely
supports the power of Congress to appoint an officer of the United States .... " (citation
omitted)); Limitations on Presidential Power, supra note 68 (arguing that the President
lacks statutory authority to "create a new entity within the Executive Branch to receive
and administer funds appropriated under the International Security and Development
Act of 1985" because the officer of such an entity must, according to the Appointments
Clause, be authorized by Congress).
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tions for officeholders with confirmation appointments are one such
unconstitutional interference.
Congress may be able to accomplish some of the goals of statutory
qualifications by specifying the powers and duties of the office. For
instance, instead of requiring that the Solicitor General be learned in
the law, 9 the statute could simply require that the Solicitor General
personally argue cases in court. Because only lawyers who are mem-
bers of the bar can appear in court, only trained and certified lawyers
would be capable of performing the duties of the Solicitor General.
A non-lawyer could still be appointed, but she would be incapable of
performing the job.
With a little more planning, Congress might be able to make the
office unattractive to people without certain qualifications. For in-
stance, it might specify that the director of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency ("FEMA") will receive a salary of $10 per year
unless she has five years of emergency management experience, in
which case the director's salary is $200,000 per year. Since Congress
has control over the powers, duties, and salary of the office, this
would be permissible. Further, the President and Senate are not pre-
vented from appointing the person of their choice to the office if that
person is willing to accept the conditions of employment.
II. THE ORIGINS AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY QUALIFICATIONS
The history of the writing and implementation of the Appoint-
ments Clause is exceptionally unclear. The clause is a compromise
between diametrically opposed views of where the appointment
power should be lodged.9° Indeed, practice has shown Presidents and
Congresses to be confused about the propriety of various appoint-
ment procedures.9'
89 See 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2000) ("The President shall appoint in the Department of justice, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Solicitor General, learned in the law, to
assist the Attorney General in the performance of his duties.").
90 See Theodore Y. Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the Origins of the Appointment Clause, 37
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1037, 1061 (1987) ("When one examines the history of the Appoint-
ments Clause.... one finds no evidence of shared convictions or purposes."); id. at 1062
("[R]epresentatives in the Convention had almost as many ideas about the rightful locus
of the appointing prerogative as there were representatives.").
91 Not to mention the lasting confusion over removal procedures. See Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 685-96 (1988) (holding that appointment of an independent counsel does
not violate separation of powers at the expense of the executive); Humphrey's Executor
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (holding that the President does not have unilateral
removal power over officers whose powers are not purely executive); Myers v. United
May 2008]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTONAL LA W
Many of the debates center around two issues: preventing ag-
grandizement and promoting accountability. Probably the most im-
portant concern was that appointments not be used to aggrandize the
individual doing the appointing: the appointer should not grant of-
fices to increase his own power, reward his supporters, or give favors
to his friends or relatives. Another central concern was that a single
person or entity be accountable for the performance of an officer: if
an incompetent person was appointed to the post, the electorate
should be able to understand who was responsible for appointing the
person. Later, a third concern was raised: efficiency. The task of
appointing officers should not cause the government to grind to a
halt, but should, in many cases be a delegated, administrative task.
The solution that the Framers worked out in the Appointments
Clause addresses all three of these issues. Modern interpreters work-
ing out doctrine to implement appointments in the absence of clear
constitutional text should also keep these principles in mind.
A. Appointments in the Founding Era
1. The Appointments Clause in the Conventions
The issue of statutory qualifications for officeholders was not dis-
cussed at the Constitutional Convention. However, the records of the
debates reveal a great deal of discussion about how much of the ap-
pointment power should be given to the President and how much to
the legislature.
The Appointments Clause grew out of dissatisfaction with the
king's prerogative of appointing officers in Britain. 2 The appoint-
ment power allowed the king to solidify his personal power by grant-
ing favors and making honors and salaries dependent on his will.
93
Many Americans of the founding generation wanted to keep the ap-
pointment power out of the hands of a single individual. 4
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding that the President does not need legislative approval
to remove executive branch officials).
92 See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 143-50 (2d
ed. 1998) (describing the skewed power structure created by the king's solitary power to
appoint officers); Blumoff, supra note 90, at 1069 ("The framers came to Philadelphia
mindful of the colonial legacy of monarchical appointment abuses, yet equally fearful of
legislative tyranny.").
93 See WOOD, supra note 92, at 144-45 (recounting the significance of the social status con-
ferred by an appointment in addition to the salary it brought with it).
94 See id. at 148 (describing Americans' desire to make sure that a single person could not
determine the political and social order); Blumoff, supra note 90, at 1061-70 (recounting
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Some delegates to the Constitutional Convention proposed plac-
ing the appointment power in the President alone. 95 But others, fear-
ing the personal power this would create for the President, insisted
that the power to appoint officers should be given to Congress alone
96
or to the Senate.97
Interestingly, while the issues of anti-aggrandizement and ac-
countability seem to have been widely accepted as centrally impor-
tant, the delegates had major disagreements on how to accomplish
them.9s Some thought that Congress, or even the Senate alone, was
too large a body to exercise the necessary responsible decision-
making,9 and that the President could be held more accountable. 10
Others worried that the President acting alone would have no check
on his power and would not exercise it responsibly. 1
Much debate ensued over whether the President or Congress was
more likely to use the appointment power wisely. Some feared that
the President would appoint his cronies to office if he had the ap-
pointment power. 1 2  Others pointed out that the members of the
Senate and House of Representatives would have many times more
personal interests and favors to repay than the President alone did.
0 3
the debates in the Constitutional Convention over the best place to lodge the appointing
power).
95 See Blumoff, supra note 90, at 1062 ('James Wilson... [thought] the Executive acting
alone would ensure appointments by 'a single, responsible person."').
96 See id. (mentioning Randolph's resolution to place the power to make judicial appoint-
ments in the legislature).
97 See id. at 1062-63 (discussing Madison's plan to place the power to make appointments in
the Senate alone).
98 See id. at 1066 ("[T]he debate focused largely on two questions: Was the Executive or the
Legislature more likely to abuse its power? And which entity, the Executive or the Legis-
lature, was more likely to be jealous and create discord if it was not given a role in the
process?").
99 See, e.g., 2 MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 41
(1911) (recounting Ghorum's argument that the Senate was too large to responsibly ap-
point officers).
100 See, e.g., id. at 43 (quoting Ghorum's statement that "[t]he Executive would certainly be
more answerable for a good appointment, as the whole blame of a bad one would fall on
him alone").
101 See id. (giving Bedford's argument that "[t]he responsibility of the Executive so much
talked of was chimerical. He could not be punished for mistakes").
102 See, e.g., id. at 81 (recounting Elseworth's argument that the President "will be more open
to caresses & intrigues than the Senate"); Blumoff, supra note 90, at 1064 (relating the
view of William Martin, Gouverneur Morris, and Sherman); id. at 1074 (relating Luther
Martin's objections to the Appointments Clause as making the President virtually a king).
103 See 1 FARRAND, supra note 99, at 119 (relating Wilson's argument that "[i]ntrigue, partial-
ity, and concealment" would be the result of legislative appointment ofjudges); id. at 120,
232-33 (noting Madison's agreement with Wilson and suggesting appointment by the
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Some saw the President as taking more responsibility with his choice
of officers; 114 others saw Senators as having more wisdom and knowl-
edge of worthy individuals from their states.10'
The final product revealed a checks-and-balances compromise be-
tween the supporters of a legislative appointment power and those of
an executive appointment power."" As Gouverneur Morris put it,
"[A]s the President was to nominate, there would be responsibility,
and as the Senate was to concur, there would be security."
0 7
The Vested Appointments Clause was added very late, with little
recorded discussion.'" It appears to have been a concession to effi-
ciency, since the appointment of inferior officers might be more trou-
ble to the President and Senate than the extra procedural checks
were worth.'0 '
After the Constitution was written, several influential Framers em-
phasized the importance of the combined powers of the President
and Senate in appointing people to offices. However, they were care-
ful to distinguish between the power of nomination, which belonged
to the President alone, and the power of appointment, which was
shared between the President and Senate.
Alexander Hamilton defended the compromise in The Federalist
Papers. On the President's nomination power, he wrote that "one
man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the pecu-
liar qualities adapted to particular offices than a body of men of
equal or perhaps even of superior discernment.." The role of the
Senate as a better solution); 2 id. at 42 (noting Ghorum's argument that "[p]ublic bodies
feel no personal responsibility and give full play to intrigue & cabal").
104 See 2 id., at 80 (presenting Madison's argument that the President "would in general be
more capable & likely to select fit characters than the Legislature ... who might hide
their selfish motives under the number concerned in the appointment").
105 See id. at 43 (relating Sherman's argument that Senators would be as wise as the President
and have more knowledge together than the President would have as an individual).
Others objected that the ideal of responsibility in appointments could never be met, no
matter who had the appointing power. See id. at 539 (giving Mr. Gerry's statement that
"[t]he President can not know all characters, and can therefore always plead ignorance").
106 See id. at 80 (recounting Madison's argument that if the President nominated a bad can-
didate, the Senate would likely refuse confirmation).
107 Id. at 539. Some delegates objected that the Senate's advice and consent role would
prove an ineffective check on Presidential power. See id. at 81, 83 (relating statements of
Elseworth and Mason).
108 See id. at 627-28 (recording just two comments); Blumoff, supra note 90, at 1068-69 (re-
marking that the clause passed after two quick votes).
109 See Blumoff, supra note 90, at 1069 n.194 ("The lack of discussion no doubt reflects the
unspoken consensus that the President (as well as the judiciary, and the heads of execu-
tive departments) must have the authority to hire and fire their own assistants.").
110 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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Senate was limited to confirming or rejecting the President's nomi-
nee-a safeguard both against sole Presidential control and against
too much meddling by the legislature."' Because the Senate had no
power to choose a nominee, Hamilton argued, it would judge the
President's nominee based solely on merit.
1 2
James Madison further elaborated the importance of the blended
appointment power in a speech on the floor of the House of Repre-
sentatives.
If there is any point in which the separation of the Legislative and Execu-
tive powers ought to be maintained with greater caution, it is that which
relates to officers and offices. The powers relative to offices are partly
Legislative and partly Executive. The Legislature creates the office, de-
fines the powers, limits its duration, and annexes a compensation. This
done, the Legislative power ceases. They ought to have nothing to do
with designating the man to fill the office. That I conceive to be of an
Executive nature. Although it be qualified in the Constitution, I would
not extend or strain that qualification beyond the limits precisely fixed
for it. We ought always to consider the Constitution with an eye to the
principles upon which it was founded. In this point of view, we shall
readily conclude that if the Legislature determines the powers, the hon-
ors, and emoluments of an office, we should be insecure if they were to
designate the officer also. The nature of things restrains and confines
the Legislative and Executive authorities in this respect; and hence it is
that the Constitution stipulates for the independence of each branch of
the Government.13
2. Early Practice of Statutory Qualifications
The First Congress took several actions relevant to the issue of
statutory qualifications of officeholders. Although it did enact several
such qualifications, it did not do so with much constitutional analysis.
In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress required that the Attorney
General and U.S. Attorneys be "learned in the law." 114 The statute did
III See id. at 425 (arguing that the Senate in its advice and consent role would not reject a
qualified nominee simply because they preferred another, since "they could not assure
themselves that the person they might wish would be brought forward by a second or by
any subsequent nomination.... [or] even be certain that a future nomination would pre-
sent a candidate in any degree more acceptable to them"); THE FEDERALIST No. 7 (Alex-
ander Hamilton) (pointing out that the House of Representatives has no role in ap-
pointments).
112 THE FEDERALIST No. 66 (Alexander Hamilton).
113 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 581-82 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
114 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Cong. Ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93 (1789).
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not specify how the officers would be appointed,"5 so Edmund
Randolph was appointed as the first Attorney General through presi-
dential nomination and Senate confirmation." 6 When the bill was be-
ing discussed in Congress, no constitutional objections were raised
regarding the restriction on officers' qualifications." 7
Objections were raised to statutory qualifications later, however.
A bill creating the office of a Superintendent of Indian Affairs would
have required that the person appointed be a military officer.
Among other objections, the record of the House of Representatives
debate reflects that the bill
was said to infringe the power of the President, and... to be unconstitu-
tional; that it may counteract the essential interests of the people, by pre-
cluding the President from appointing perhaps the most proper charac-
ter in the United States; that persons in civil life may be found fully
competent to the business, many such possessing a perfect knowledge of
Indian affairs." 8
In support of the requirement that the officeholder be a military
officer, other members of the House argued that a military officer
would in fact be the best fit for the job. Responding to the constitu-
tional argument, only references to precedent are recorded. Nobody
defended the constitutionality of statutory qualifications as such. In-
stead, the argument was that "the President and Senate are restricted
in their appointments of officers in several other departments. The
Attorney-General must be a person learned in the law. ,, 19
The provision requiring the Superintendent to be a military offi-
cer was later removed from the bill, apparently for non-constitutional
reasons.2 0 Later, another bill would have created a commission with
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller as members. 121
Some members of Congress viewed this as the creation of a new posi-
tion (commissioner) and the unconstitutional appointment by Con-
gress of two members (the people serving as Secretary of Treasury
115 See id.; DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-
1801, at 43 (1997) ("[T]he statute did not say who was to appoint or remove them.").
116 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1991, 49-50 (Linda
Grant De Pauw ed., 1974).
117 See CURRIE, supra note 115, at 43 ("Congress significantly if sensibly restricted the Presi-
dent's discretion in selecting them. Nobody seems to have suggested that in doing so
Congress offended the appointment provisions of Article II.").
118 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1523 (1790).
119 Id.
120 See CURRIE, supra note 115, at 43 n.255 ("[T]he military qualification had disappeared-
the precedents suggested for reasons of policy rather than constitutional compulsion.").
121 See id. ("[A] bill to create a commission .... designating the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Comptroller as members").
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and Comptroller). Against this, defenders of the bill argued that it
was constitutional because it consisted only of adding duties to exist-
ing offices, not appointing new officers, and because the commis-
sion's functions would be legislative. The provision was removed,
but it is not clear whether for constitutional or policy reasons.1
2 3
Two things are of note about these brief constitutional debates.
First, nobody actually defended the constitutionality of statutory
qualifications on any principled ground, such as political theory,
structural constraints between the branches, or constitutional text.
The issue might have been resolved quite differently had the consti-
tutional objection been raised before any precedent had been cre-
ated. Second, the House of Representatives-a body given no say in
appointments under the Constitution-found itself debating whether
a nominee with certain qualifications would be qualified for office.
During the drafting of the Constitution, most of the delegates were
strongly against allowing the House any role in appointments.'
24
B. Statutory Qualifications After the Founding
Following the early example of the Attorney General qualifica-
tions, Congress has passed countless laws establishing offices and pre-
scribing qualifications for the officeholders.125 Statutory qualifications
have been attached for both confirmation126 and vested appoint-
ments.
121
122 See id. ("Sedgwick retorted with considerable force that the Constitution did not forbid
Congress to attach additional duties to existing offices, and Madison argued that, since
the commission's functions were legislative, Congress could appoint its members.").
123 See id. ("Nevertheless the offending language was removed-whether for reasons of policy
or constitutional compulsion was not made clear.").
124 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 110, at 430-31 (noting that
the "scheme" of "uniting the House of Representatives in the power of making [appoint-
ments]" had "some, though but a few advocates," and arguing that "[a] body so fluctuat-
ing and at the same time so numerous can never be deemed proper for the exercise of
[the appointment] power").
125 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 265-74 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (col-
lecting a large number of statutes prescribing qualifications for officeholders between
1789 and 1926).
126 See, e.g., 6 U.S.C.A. § 313(c)(2) (2007) (listing professional experience requirements for
Administrator of FEMA); 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a) (1) (2000) (giving political party require-
ments for members of FEC); 29 U.S.C. § 12 (2000) (requiring that the Director of
Women's Bureau at Department of Labor must be a woman); An Act to Provide a Gov-
ernment for the Territory of Hawaii, 56 Cong. Ch. 339, § 66, 31 Stat. 141, 153 (1900)
(noting citizenship and age requirements for territorial governor of Hawaii); Private Land
Claims, supra note 62 (listing citizenship, residency, and professional requirement for a
U.S. Attorney in courts of private land claims); An Act to Remodel the Diplomatic and
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The debate has been characterized by a broad agreement that
statutory qualifications are generally permitted, but extensive dis-
agreement exists on the details of which sorts of qualifications en-
croach too much on the President's appointment power. Both the
majority and dissent in Myers v. United States agreed that statutory
qualifications for officeholders were generally constitutional. 2
Presidents have generally abided by such qualifications, 1 29 with
some notable exceptions. 13 Some Presidents have also noted their
objections to statutory qualifications, on principle or in particular
cases, while continuing to follow the requirements; this is possibly
Consular Systems of the United States, 33 Cong. Ch. 133, § 9, 10 Star. 619, 623 (1855) (es-
tablishing a citizenship requirement for diplomatic officials, some of whom have confir-
mation appointments); An Act to Carry into Effect Certain Stipulations of the Treaty Be-
tween U.S. and Republic of Mexico, ch. 107, § 2, 9 Stat. 393 (1849) (creating a bilingual
fluency requirement for translator).
127 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C.A. § 3(b)(1) (2002) (giving the citizenship and experience require-
ments for the position of Deputy Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Of-
fice, with the appointment power vested in the Secretary of Commerce); An Act for Mak-
ing Appropriations for the Consular and Diplomatic Expenses of the Government for the
Year Ending Thirtieth June, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Five, and for Other Purposes.,
38 Cong. Ch. 136, § 2, 13 Stat. 137, 139 (1864) (listing citizenship, age, and examination
requirements for consular clerks); Private Land Claims, supra note 62 (giving citizenship,
residency, and bilingual fluency requirements for a court translator whose appointment is
vested in the court); An Act Authorizing the President To Appoint Commissioners To
Examine and Report upon the Sutro Tunnel in the State of Nevada, 42 Cong. Ch. 9, 17
Stat. 3 (1871) [hereinafter Sutro Tunnel] (setting professional requirements for engineer-
ing inspectors); An Act to Regulate the Diplomatic and Consular Systems of the United
States, 34 Cong. Ch. 127, § 7, 11 Stat. 52, 55 (1856) (listing citizenship requirement for
consular pupils).
128 Myers, 272 U.S. at 128-29 (holding that limitations are constitutional so long as they do
not amount to a legislative designation); id. at 264-75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (tracing
the long history of statutory limitations to the appointment power). Several more recent
opinions have agreed. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 740 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("[It is entirely proper for Congress to specify the qualifications for an of-
fice that it has created . . ").
129 See Myers, 272 U.S. at 265 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Every President has consis-
tently observed [statutory qualifications for officeholders]. This is true of those offices to
which he makes appointments without the advice and consent of the Senate as well as of
those for which its consent is required."); Kochan, supra note 8, at 47 (noting that the
statutory requirement that the head of the Department of Labor's Women's Bureau be a
woman has always been followed).
130 President Jackson once protested that a Senate resolution preferring offices in a state to
be filled by citizens of that state, coupled with several refusals to confirm officers not
meeting the citizenship preference, was unconstitutional. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 275
(1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For other examples, see CORWIN, supra note 30, at 74
n.20.
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due to political constraints or because their favored candidates hap-
pened to meet the requirements.
3 '
The executive branch has relatively consistently favored a balanc-
ing approach to determine which statutory qualifications are permis-
sible and which restrict the President's appointment power too
much.1 32 A notable exception is the separation of powers memo writ-
ten by Assistant Attorney General William Barr in 1989. In that opin-
ion, Barr argued that statutory qualifications for principal officers are
unconstitutional, but did not make any statement regarding statutory
qualifications for inferior officers.'33
131 See, e.g., Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing the Lobbying Disclosure
Act of 1995, 2 PUB. PAPERS OF WILLIAMJ. CLINTON 1907 (Dec. 19, 1995) ("The Congress
may not, of course, impose broad restrictions on the President's constitutional preroga-
tive to nominate persons of his choosing to the highest executive branch positions, and
this is especially so in the area of foreign relations. However, because as a policy matter I
agree with the goal of ensuring the undivided loyalty of our representatives in trade nego-
tiations, I intend, as a matter of practice, to act in accordance with this provision."); Bush
Statement on H.R. 5441, supra note 12 ("Section 503(c) (2) vests in the President author-
ity to appoint the Administrator [of FEMA], by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, but purports to limit the qualifications of the pool of persons from whom the
President may select the appointee in a manner that rules out a large portion of those
persons best qualified by experience and knowledge to fill the office. The executive
branch shall construe section 503(c) (2) in a manner consistent with the Appointments
Clause of the Constitution."); Civil Service Commission, supra note 39 (arguing that a re-
quirement to appoint the person who scores highest on an examination is unconstitu-
tional, though statutory qualifications in general are permissible); Common Legislative
Encroachments, supra note 8, at 250 (arguing that statutory qualifications for principal
officers are unconstitutional); U.S. Trade Rep. Opinion, supra note 40, at 280 (arguing
that particular statutory qualifications for the U.S. Trade Representative unconstitution-
ally constrain the President's power of appointment, though statutory qualifications in
general are permissible).
132 See, e.g., Civil Service Commission, supra note 39, at 524-25 (arguing that Congress can
establish qualifications for a governmental office); U.S. Trade Rep. Opinion, supra note
40, at 280 (advocating a balance between the President's appointment power and the
power of Congress to prescribe qualifications).
133 See Common Legislative Encroachments, supra note 8, at 250 ("Congress also imposes
impermissible qualifications requirements on principal officers. For instance, Congress
will require that a fixed number of members of certain commissions be from a particular
political party. These requirements also violate the Appointments Clause. The only con-
gressional check that the Constitution places on the President's power to appoint 'princi-
pal officers' is the advice and consent of the Senate."). See also Civil Service Commission,
supra note 39 (taking a functionalist approach and arguing that statutory qualifications
that leave the President significant discretion are constitutional while those that are too
narrowly restrictive are unconstitutional).
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C. Longstanding Practice and Constitutional Interpretation
With such a long history of statutory qualifications being applied
to confirmation appointments, one might ask whether it is best to de-
fer to that practice. For the sake of stability and practicality, it may be
worth sticking to long-established procedures that do not cause too
much constitutional disruption.3 4 But a long history of violating the
Constitution does not make continuing violations acceptable. Acqui-
escence in a practice believed to be unconstitutional can only be rea-
sonable if there is a good argument that the practice is in fact consti-
tutional.
When deciding whether to move away from a long-used process
on the grounds that the process is actually unconstitutional, one
should examine the arguments put forward to defend the process. In
the case of statutory qualifications, there have been no principled ar-
guments presented at all. The constitutionality of statutory qualifica-
tions was not discussed the first time the device was used in a law.
3 5
When the issue was raised shortly thereafter, the defenders of statu-
tory qualifications simply pointed to precedent and raised no further
arguments in defense. 36
Through the years, statutory qualifications have been much used
but little discussed. There have been no Supreme Court cases di-
rectly addressing the issue. Few cases have even touched on the issue
at all. 137 So, despite the longstanding practice of enacting statutory
qualifications, there has been almost no actual formal consideration
of its constitutionality.
The practices of the First Congress are often considered to be of
extra importance in constitutional interpretation because they reflect
the understanding of the Framers and the public at the time of the
134 See, e.g., Congressional Restrictions, supra note 8, at 1927-34 (making the case for deference
to the longstanding practice of statutory restrictions on the appointment power).
135 See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text (discussing the early use of, and objec-
tions to, statutory qualifications).
136 See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text (noting a specific example of a statutory
qualification).
137 A notable exception is Myers v. United States, in which ChiefJustice Taft's majority opinion
and Justice Brandeis's dissent both discussed statutory qualifications as an example of
congressional control over the President's appointment power. 272 U.S. 52, 128-31
(1926); id. at 264-75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But statutory qualifications were not at is-
sue in Myers- the question was whether Congress could limit the President's removal
power.
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Founding. 3 The First Congress did impose statutory qualifications,
but once again, it did so without any significant constitutional analy-
sis. 139 The First Congress was certainly not infallible in its interpreta-
tion of the Constitution. Its practices can add weight to an argument
about constitutionality, but they cannot be decisive.
The Framers were particularly concerned about Congress aggran-
dizing its powers and overstepping its constitutional limits. The fact
that Congress has successfully done so in the area of statutory qualifi-
cations for a long time should not give it license to continue doing so.
III. PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF STATUTORY
RESTRICTIONS ON THE APPOINTMENT POWER
Allowing statutory qualifications for vested appointments but not
confirmation appointments is consistent with the Constitution's
structure. History shows that the Framers were concerned with two
primary goals in the appointments process: accountability and anti-
aggrandizement on the part of both the President and Congress.
Additionally, they wanted the procedures to be efficient. The two
appointment processes accomplish all of these goals, but in different
ways.
A. Checks and Balances
The primary power of nomination and appointment is given to
the President in order to establish accountability in a single person.
The Senate's advice and consent role in appointments is designed as
a check on the President to prevent abuses of the appointment
power. Statutory qualifications for confirmation appointments can
under some circumstances hinder this process and lead to less ac-
countability. In vested appointments, however, when the Senate gives
up its advice and consent role, statutory qualifications replace con-
firmation as a useful check on power.
138 See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1164-76 (2003) (discussing the interpretive force
of different kinds of early constitutional practices).
139 See supra notes 114-119 and accompanying text (discussing the development of and ob-
jections to statutory qualifications).
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1. Checks and Balances in Confirmation Appointments
The Framers thought the Senate was too large a body to responsi-
bly nominate or appoint officers, so these powers were given primar-
ily to the President.4 ' However, fearing that the President might ap-
point his cronies to office regardless of their fitness for the job, they
gave the Senate the advice and consent role. 4' Statutory qualifica-
tions have the potential to disrupt this carefully balanced process.
In the confirmation appointments process, statutory qualifications
can actually have the effect of decreasing accountability. If the Attor-
ney General is required to be "learned in the law," the President and
Senate can claim, on appointing a person who is a bad choice in
other respects, that she meets the minimum qualifications. On the
other side of the spectrum, if the statutory qualifications are ex-
tremely restrictive, as in the case of the U.S. Trade Representative,
the President and Senate might not be able to appoint the candidate
that they think is best, because she does not meet all the statutory re-
quirements.
42
Some qualifications might be written into law in a previous Con-
gress and remain for years to limit the discretion, or dull the advice
and consent inquiry, of later Senates. The Constitution requires the
advice and consent of the current Senate, not the dead hand of one
from two or ten or fifty years ago.
By contrast, the advice and consent process cannot grow old and
stale. It allows-indeed, requires-individualized consideration of
the nominee by the Senate. Senators have the opportunity to con-
sider the nominee on her own merits and evaluate her fitness for of-
fice. If the President's choice of nominee is a bad one, he must take
full responsibility for the error and cannot hide behind any statutory
requirements as forcing his hand.
If certain qualifications are really important, the President will
probably not nominate, and the Senate will probably not confirm,
someone who does not have those qualifications. 43 Even if the Presi-
140 See supra notes 99-100, 103 and accompanying text (discussing the concerns of the Fram-
ers that resulted in balancing the President's appointment powers with the Senate's ad-
vise and consent role).
141 Seesupra notes 102, 106-107 and accompanying text (same).
142 See U.S. Trade Rep. Opinion, supra note 40, at 280 (arguing that particular statutory quali-
fications for the U.S. Trade Representative unconstitutionally constrain the President's
power of appointment); 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1575 (1790) (debating whether a non-
military officer would be qualified for an Indian affairs office).
143 See, e.g., FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[I]t is hard
to imagine that the President would wish to alter that balance [of political party represen-
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dent chooses to nominate someone who is not qualified for the job,
the Senate's advice and consent role provides a check on his ability to
appoint that person.
Thus, statutory qualifications for confirmation appointments can
be accountability-reducing, counterproductive, or superfluous. The
Senate's confirmation is a much better mechanism for ensuring over-
sight and quality of officers, because it allows an individualized
evaluation of the nominee for an important office.
2. Checks and Balances in Vested Appointments
Vested appointments do not have the structural check of Senate
confirmation to make sure the President is appointing qualified indi-
viduals to office. Statutory qualifications provide an efficient, if non-
individualized, substitute that serves the same purpose. The Framers
envisioned that this process would be used primarily for lower-level
officials on whom the Senate did not need to keep such a close eye.
The vested appointments process seems designed to efficiently
appoint inferior officers. The Framers realized that the Senate need
not be bothered with confirmation of every officer, however adminis-
trative or trivial her functions were to be. 144 Accountability for the
quality of those officers remains primarily with the President, so that
the blame for bad performance can be placed directly on his shoul-
ders.
But the Framers did not want to give the President the sole power
of appointing officers, since appointment is such a useful tool for in-
creasing personal power. 45 When Senate confirmation is too burden-
some a process, statutory qualifications are a good alternative. They
limit the President's discretion to reward his supporters and they
help ensure that the person appointed to the office will be at least
minimally qualified to perform the job.1
46
tation on the FEC], even if the understanding had not been reflected in the statutory lan-
guage.").
144 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 99, at 627-28 (describing the Vested Appointments Clause as
.too necessary[] to be omitted"); Blumoff, supra note 90, at 1068-69 n.194 (arguing that
the Vested Appointments Clause "reflects the unspoken consensus that the President (as
well as the judiciary, and the heads of executive departments) must have the authority to
hire and fire their own assistants").
145 See WOOD, supra note 92, at 143-50 (discussing the belief that an executive who could
appoint government officials was in a position to wield great power); supra notes 92-94
and accompanying text (noting the debate that surrounded the Appointments Clause).
146 One problem with statutory qualifications is that qualifications relevant when the statute
is passed might become superfluous or obsolete over time, and Congress might not
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The vested appointments process is not mandatory for inferior of-
ficers, but left to Congress's discretion to allow.147 Because of this,
Congress can adjust the balance of appointment power between the
President, Senate, department heads, and courts depending on how
responsibly they think those individuals and institutions are acting.
Vested appointments allow not just a check on the President, but also
on the Senate if it is abusing its role in confirmation appointments.
B. Constitutional and Statutory Qualifications for Officers
The Constitution itself imposes some limitations on eligibility to
hold federal office.14  The existence of constitutional qualifications
suggests that Congress may not impose additional qualifications by
statute.
Congress and the states do not have the power to impose qualifi-
cations for holding elected office in addition to the qualifications re-
quired by the Constitution. The Supreme Court addressed this ques-
tion in Powell v. McCormack149 and U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton. 51 Powell
involved the House of Representatives' refusal to seat a person
elected to that body based on evidence that he had committed
crimes. 5' The Court held that the power given to each house of
Congress to "be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifica-
tions of its own Members"' 52 does not include the authority to impose
additional qualifications for holding elective office.
153
Similarly, in U.S. Term Limits, the Court held that states cannot
impose qualifications for holding federal elected office. At issue was
bother to amend the statute. Imagine, for example, an old statute requiring a court re-
porter to be capable of writing in shorthand, which has become obsolete with the advent
of computers and stenographic technology. Congress should regularly reconsider statu-
tory qualifications to ensure that they are up to date.
147 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (noting that Congress can vest the appointment of infe-
rior officers in the President alone); see also Krent, supra note 86, at 1401 (noting that
Congress can vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President or heads of de-
partments). See infra Part III.D for a discussion of the odd features of allowing Congress,
not the Senate alone, to vest appointments.
148 See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 30, at 647 ("That the President has constitutional obliga-
tions in his act of nomination is neither startling nor anomalous. Substantial evidence
indicates that the Framers contemplated that the President would take account of his
constitutional responsibilities when carrying out his presidential duties.").
149 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
150 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
151 See Powell, 395 U.S. at 490.
152 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
153 PoweU, 395 U.S. at 550.
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an amendment to the Arkansas Constitution that prevented a candi-
date for the House of Representatives or Senate from appearing on
the ballot if she had served a certain number of terms previously.
54
The Court reaffirmed Powells holding that Congress cannot add to
the qualifications required for its members15' and expanded the hold-
ing to deny that power to states as well.156 The Court noted that the
Framers included specific qualifications in the Constitution with the
knowledge that they would be understood as the only permissible
qualifications for holding elected office. 157 With no further restric-
tions allowed, "the door of this part of the federal government is
open to merit of every description.
The Incompatibility Clause sets a limit both on membership in
Congress and on holding an appointed office-namely, that the same
person cannot do both at the same time. The Ineligibility Clause im-
poses an additional limit for appointed offices. The two clauses read
as follows:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the
United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments
whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either
House during his Continuance in Office.
59
The President, therefore, may not appoint a Senator or Represen-
tative to a newly-created office or to one which has increased in salary
during that person's current term in Congress. He also may not ap-
point a member of Congress to any office unless the person resigns
from Congress.
Without any additional grant of power to Congress to set qualifi-
cations for officeholders, it would seem that the explicit constitu-
tional qualifications are the only ones. Some people have made this
argument.16° But this ignores the Vested Appointments Clause, which
154 US. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 783.
155 Id. at 798.
156 Id. at 827.
157 Id. at 792-93.
158 Id. at 794 (quoting Powel4 395 U.S. at 540 n.74).
159 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
160 See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 484 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) ("[Tihe sole limitation on the President's power to nominate these officials is
found in the Incompatibility Clause .... ."); Kochan, supra note 8, at 51-52 (using the ex-
pressio unius canon to argue that the Ineligibility and Incompatibility Clauses rule out
other limitations on appointments).
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specifically gives Congress the power to prescribe statutory qualifica-
tions for vested appointments. 161
The constitutional qualifications are the main restrictions on con-
firmation appointments, but they are not the only ones. All of the
President's actions must conform with his duty to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.' 162 This means that, whenever an officer
would assist in executing the laws, the President has a duty to appoint
someone who he believes would faithfully execute the laws, possibly
even according to the President's own views of how the law should be
interpreted."3 In the broad run of cases, though, theories of law and
constitutional interpretation are of limited importance for an officer.
Inferior executive officers must obey the President's directives, so
their legal and policy views are less relevant. Many officers, such as
goodwill ambassadors, 4 translators,6  and project inspectors,66 have
no duties that are relevant to law or policy.
Even though statutory qualifications are generally allowed for
vested appointments, in some instances the qualifications may go be-
yond Congress's power to set requirements. The Constitution allows
Congress to vest the appointment of an inferior officer in the Presi-
dent, the courts, or the heads of departments, but not in Congress it-
self. A set of statutory qualifications that is too tightly drawn could
constitute a congressional usurpation of the appointment power.167
In the extreme case, Congress might intentionally require qualifica-
161 See supra Part 1.B.
162 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
163 Professor McGinnis argues that in judicial nominations, the President has a constitutional
obligation to nominate judges who agree with his own philosophy of constitutional inter-
pretation. See McGinnis, supra note 30, at 646-52; see alsoJudges - Appointment - Age Fac-
tor, 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 388 (1979) [hereinafter Age Factor Opinion] ("In making
[nominations for judicial] appointments, the President is constitutionally entitled to ex-
ercise his discretion and to follow policies that in his view will serve the interests of the
Nation.").
164 See, e.g., Joint Resolution Authorizing the President to Appoint One woman Commis-
sioner to Represent the United States and the National Society of the Daughters of the
American Revolution at the Unveiling of the Statue of Lafayette at the Exposition in
Paris, France, in Nineteen Hundred, 56 Res. No. 9, 31 Stat. 711 (1900) (authorizing the
President to appoint a commissioner to represent the United States at the unveiling of a
statte in Paris, France).
165 See, e.g., Private Land Claims, supra note 62 (authorizing a court to appoint a translator to
assist in its proceedings).
166 See, e.g., Sutro Tunnel, supra note 127 (authorizing the President to appoint a board of en-
gineers to inspect a tunnel under construction in Nevada).
167 See Civil Service Commission, supra note 39, at 524 ("Though the appointing power alone
can designate an individual for an office... Congress[] by direct legislation ... can pre-
scribe qualifications ....").
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tions that only a single person possesses.m There is no difference be-
tween Congress limiting the pool of qualified candidates to one per-
son and naming the individual to hold the office itself. Either move
by Congress would overstep its constitutionally granted powers.
Even limiting the President's choice of officers to a small set of
individuals is probably an unconstitutional interference with the
vested appointments power. The executive branch has long used a
functionalist balancing test to decide when statutory qualifications in-
terfere too much with the President's authority. 9 While the func-
tionalist test is not appropriate for confirmation appointments, since
those are ruled out by the text and structure of the Constitution, it is
useful in determining the extent of Congress's power to place restric-
tions on vested appointments. 170
The line between statutory qualifications that encroach too much
on the President's power and those that are acceptable may be im-
possible to draw with precision. 7' The answer may well be different
for officers who perform different roles. The President might need
more discretion to choose officers who work closely with him and
provide advice or officers who perform more important tasks. 72 The
fact that the line is not clear in advance, or not the same for all offi-
cers, does not mean that the test is unworkable or valueless. 73 Con-
168 See CORWIN, supra note 30, at 74 n.20 (detailing examples of Congress requiring ap-
pointment of a named individual or an individual with a set of qualifications held by only
one person).
169 See id. (taking a functionalist approach and arguing that statutory qualifications that leave
the President significant discretion are constitutional while those that are too narrowly
restrictive are unconstitutional); U.S. Trade Rep. Opinion, supra note 40 (following the
1871 Civil Service Commission opinion).
170 Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation
of Powers Cases, 22 HAR. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 28-29 (1998) (advocating a blend of for-
malism and functionalism in separation of powers analysis).
171 See Civil Service Commission, supra note 39, at 525 ("But it may be asked, at what point
must the contracting process [of prescribing statutory qualifications] stop? I confess my
inability to answer.").
172 See U.S. Trade Rep. Opinion, supra note 40, at 280 (arguing that particular statutory quali-
fications for the U.S. Trade Representative unconstitutionally constrain the President's
power of appointment because, among other reasons, "the position in question is espe-
cially close to the President"); Age Factor Opinion, supra note 163, at 389 ("Congress has
required that the President appoint members of both parties to certain kinds of boards
and commissions; there is serious question whether Congress could constitutionally re-
quire the President to follow the same practice with respect to his Cabinet.").
173 See Civil Service Commission, supra note 39, at 525 ("But the difficulty of drawing a line
between such limitations as are, and such as are not, allowed by the Constitution, is no
proof that both classes do not exist. In constitutional and legal inquiries, right or wrong
is often a question of degree.").
May 2008]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAV. W
gress and the President must work together to determine the proper
mix of accountability and oversight in each case.
C. The Confirmation Appointments Clause as an Inverse Presentment Clause
The Confirmation Appointments Clause is structured as almost
the inverse of the Presentment Clause. 74 The Presentment Clause
requires that for a bill to become a law, it must be created and passed
by a majority of both houses, then presented to the President for his
approval or veto. 175 The Confirmation Appointments Clause works in
reverse-the President must choose and nominate a person for of-
fice, and then present that nominee to the Senate 76 for confirmation
or rejection.
7
The Supreme Court has firmly prevented deviations from the Pre-
sentment Clause process, calling it a "finely wrought and exhaustively
considered[] procedure.' 178 The Confirmation Appointments Clause
was also carefully structured by the Framers to achieve the appropri-
ate balance of power and security against bad officeholders. 7 9 Con-
gress, the President, and the courts should therefore be similarly re-
luctant to change the procedure.
80
174 See Blumoff, supra note 90, at 1071-73 (comparing the blending of appointment powers
between the President and Senate to the veto provision in creating laws). The conven-
tion also considered a proposal that would have allowed the President to appoint officers
if the Senate did not disagree within a certain number of days. 2 FARRAND, supra note 99,
at 38. This proposal bears a striking resemblance to the provision of Article II, § 7 which
allows a bill to become law without the President's signature. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2
("If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) af-
ter it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he
had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which
Case it shall not be a Law.").
175 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
176 The two clauses are non-parallel in that the Presentment Clause involves the President
plus both houses of Congress, whereas the Appointments Clause involves the President
plus only the Senate, to the exclusion of the House of Representatives. Alexander Hamil-
ton argued that the House should not have a part in confirmation of officers because its
large size and frequently changing membership would make it unsuitable to the task of
providing stability in appointments. THE FEDERALIST No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton).
177 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
178 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
179 See THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that the selection of compe-
tent officials is better performed by a single person but that the concurrence of an as-
sembly will help prevent cronyism).
180 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 581-82 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) ("Although [the President's ap-
pointment power] be qualified in the Constitution, I would not extend or strain that
qualification beyond the limits precisely fixed for it.").
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Unlike the Presentment Clause, the Appointments Clause creates
two alternative procedures by which appointments to federal office
can be made. The confirmation appointments method, required for
principal officers and optional for inferior officers, is through Presi-
dential nomination and Senate confirmation.18 ' The vested appoint-
ments method for inferior officers, at Congress's discretion, is to vest
the appointment solely in the President, a court, or the head of a de-
partment. 182
Even though two different methods are allowed, the methods
both have the status of constitutionally-prescribed procedures. Con-
gress cannot create a hybrid procedure or make up new procedures
at its whim.18 3 The analogy is obvious in the Presentment Clause con-
text: Congress can pass a law over the President's veto by a two-thirds
majority, but it cannot skip presentment entirely if a bill passes by a
two-thirds majority in the first instance.
When establishing an appointed inferior office, then, Congress
may choose whether to appoint the officer through the confirmation
process or the vested process. That decision is an on-off switch.
Congress must choose one process or the other. It cannot blend fea-
tures from the two different processes. It cannot require Senate con-
firmation (a confirmation appointments process) and simultaneously
require statutory qualifications (a vested appointments process),
D. The House of Representatives
The Constitution specifically and deliberately cuts the House of
Representatives out of the process of confirmation appointments."s4
The President has the sole power of nomination. The President and
Senate together have the power of appointment. But the House of
Representatives is given no direct role, either on its own or together
with the Senate. The House has various powers it can use to check
181 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
182 See id. Congress cannot vest the appointment of officers, even legislative officers, in Con-
gress itself. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 127 (1976) (per curiam) ("While the [Ap-
pointments] Clause expressly authorizes Congress to vest the appointment of certain offi-
cers in the 'Courts of Law,' the absence of similar language to include Congress must
mean that neither Congress nor its officers were included within the language 'Heads of
Departments' .... ").
183 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 127 ("[T] here is no provision of the Constitution remotely provid-
ing any alternative means [of appointment] for the selection of the members of the
Commission or for anybody like them.").
184 See supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text (citing historical arguments for excluding
the House of Representatives from the appointments process).
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the appointment powers of the President and Senate. But statutory
qualifications for officeholders are not a constitutionally authorized
check and instead illegitimately give the House of Representatives a
direct role in the appointment of officers.
1. The House's Indirect Checks on the Appointment Power
The House of Representatives does not have a direct role in con-
firmation appointments, but is not powerless against the appoint-
ment powers of the President and Senate. Far from it. The Constitu-
tion gives the House numerous tools to check abuses of the
appointment power. The House of Representatives is involved in
creating offices by statute before anyone can be appointed to them,
and in setting the powers, duties, and salary of each office. The
House also has a role in deciding whether the appointment to an of-
fice will be through the confirmation appointments process or the
vested appointments process. Finally, the House can initiate im-
peachment of any officer. When the available tools are understood,
statutory qualifications seem much less important as a means of con-
trolling the appointment power.
First and most basically, no person can be appointed to office un-
til the office is created by law. Passing a law requires the concurrence
of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The House of
Representatives therefore has an important role in creating an office
in the first place, specifying the powers and duties of the officer, and
setting the officer's salary. 5' This is true both when the office is ini-
tially created and for any changes to the powers, duties, or salary at-
tached to the office. If the House of Representatives is dissatisfied
with an officer's performance, it can initiate legislation to lower the
officer's salary, remove duties from the officer, or even eliminate the
office altogether.
18 6
The House of Representatives also has a say in whether an office is
filled through the confirmation appointments process or the vested
appointments process. To vest an appointment in the President, the
head of a department, or a court, Congress must pass a law. If the
House of Representatives is dissatisfied with the Senate's participation
185 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 581-82 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
186 These options are unavailable if the officer is a federal judge, because judges have guar-
anteed salary protection and life tenure. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both
of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be di-
minished during their Continuance in Office.").
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in appointing people to a particular office-for instance, if the Sen-
ate has been rejecting nominees the House would like to see take of-
fice-the House can initiate legislation to vest the appointment in the
President alone without confirmation by the Senate. v If the House is
dissatisfied with the President's nominees, it can initiate legislation
that would vest the appointment in one of the other constitutionally
authorized appointers.
Granted, the House of Representatives cannot unilaterally pass
laws vesting appointments whenever it is dissatisfied with the Presi-
dent or Senate. It must obtain the cooperation of the Senate and
President (or a two-thirds majority in both the House and Senate) to
move appointments from the confirmation process to the vested
process. The Senate and President will likely be reluctant to give up
their appointment powers. As in any legislation, the House would
need to use bargaining leverage and political tools to accomplish its
goals. Even if the law is not actually passed, simply introducing a bill
to vest appointments could send a strong message that the House dis-
approves of the job the President and Senate have been doing.
Once an appointment has been vested by statute, the House can
unilaterally prevent it from returning to the confirmation appoint-
ment process. Going back to a confirmation appointment would re-
quire amending or repealing the statute that vested the appointment,
neither of which can be done without the concurrence of the House
of Representatives...
The House of Representatives also has a pivotal role in removing
officers who have behaved criminally. Impeachment and conviction
is the only process through which Congress can remove executive
and judicial officers from office. The Supreme Court has held that
Congress may not retain any other removal power over executive
branch officials,"' and of course federal judges can only be removed
by impeachment and conviction.'90 Interestingly, even though the
187 See John C. Eastman, The Limited Nature of the Senate's Advice and Consent Role, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 633, 636-37 (2003) (advocating that the House of Representatives initiate
legislation to vest appointment of federal judges in the President alone when the Senate
fails to confirm or reject nominees within a reasonable time period).
188 This is true unless the statute vesting the appointment has a sunset provision. In that
case, the appointment would return to the confirmation process after a specified time pe-
riod without further intervention by statute.
189 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
190 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. But see generally Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How To
Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72 (2006) (arguing that the historical meaning of
"good behavior" tenure included removal methods other than impeachment).
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Senate has a role in the appointments process, it cannot initiate the
process of removing an officer through impeachment. The power of
impeachment is given exclusively to the House of Representatives.19'
The Senate's role of trying impeachment cases is the second step of
the process. The Senate is thus the second mover in both appoint-
ment through confirmation and removal through impeachment and
conviction.
2. Statutory Qualifications as a Forbidden Direct Role for the House
The text, history, and structure of the Constitution show that the
Framers did not give the House of Representatives any direct role in
appointment of officers through the confirmation appointment
process. Enacting statutory qualifications contravenes the structure
of the Constitution by giving the House of Representatives a direct
role in confirming nominees for appointment. Not only is the en-
actment of a statutory qualification itself an exercise of appointment
power, but also the existence of such statutory qualifications creates
the opportunity for the House of Representatives to play a role equal
to the Senate in later appointments.
The people who set qualifications for officeholders have a direct
role in appointment to those positions. Job qualifications limit the
set of individuals who can hold the job. Deciding who may and who
may not qualify for a job is part of appointing someone to that job,
even though it is not the final factor which determines whether an
individual will be selected. Most importantly, the power to set office-
holder qualifications is an in-advance veto power over appointment
to the office. The Constitution gives appointment power-and veto
power over appointments-only to the Senate, not to the House of
Representatives.
When statutory qualifications limit the pool of individuals who can
hold office and the President nominates someone who meets the
qualifications, his choice may have been constrained by the will of the
House of Representatives. He might not even have considered indi-
viduals who could have performed well but failed to meet the statu-
tory qualifications. In many cases, the Senate might have consented
to the appointment. The opinion of the House of Representatives,
encoded in a statute in advance, prevents the nomination and ap-
191 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (giving the House of Representatives "the sole Power of Im-
peachment" (emphasis added)).
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pointment of anyone outside the set of individuals meeting the statu-
tory qualifications.
Statutory qualifications violate the structure of the Constitution
even more profoundly when the person the President and Senate
want to appoint does not meet the prescribed qualifications. This was
the case when President Clinton nominated Charlene Barshefsky to
be U.S. Trade Representative. 192 There are two possibilities in this
kind of situation: either the House of Representatives also wants the
person to be appointed or it does not. In either situation, the House
of Representatives plays a pivotal role in the appointment-a situa-
tion that the Framers intended to avoid and the text of the Constitu-
tion actually forbade.
In the real-life example, the House of Representatives approved of
Charlene Barshefsky's nomination. President Clinton suggested leg-
islation that would amend the statutory qualifications to allow her
appointment.' 93 Interestingly, though, the bill that was passed did not
remove the qualification entirely or amend it in general terms to re-
move the problem. Instead, it singled out Charlene Barshefsky by
name and announced that the statutory qualification did not apply to
her but still remained in effect for all future appointees to the posi-
tion of U.S. Trade Representative.
194
The Barshefsky amendment to the U.S. Trade Representative
qualifications statute was essentially a confirmation by the Senate and
House of Representatives together. Both houses had to pass the bill
by majority vote before Barshefsky could be appointed to office. The
Constitution conspicuously requires officers to be confirmed only by
the Senate, not both houses of Congress acting together.
Congress could not pass a law requiring all appointees to be con-
firmed by the House of Representatives in addition to the Senate.
But restrictive statutory qualifications create the same effect. Imagine
a statute stating, "No person shall be appointed to any office of the
United States."'9 Whenever an office needed to be filled, Congress
192 See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
193 See Appointment of U.S. Trade Representative: Waiver of Trade Act Provisions, Pub. L.
No. 105-5, 111 Stat. 11 (1997).
194 See id. ("[N]otwithstanding ... any other provision of law, the President, acting by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, is authorized to appoint Charlene Barshefsky
as the United States Trade Representative.").
195 The statute could be phrased even more like ajob qualification by prescribing qualifica-
tions that nobody meets. For instance, "All persons holding offices of the United States
shall be at least 150 years of age," or "All persons holding offices of the United States shall
hold Ph.D. degrees in at least ten different fields of study."
May 20081
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
could pass a private bill stating, "Notwithstanding the ban on ap-
pointments, the President may appoint [name of individual] as
[name of office]." This would effectively require confirmation by
both the House of Representatives and the Senate for all federal ap-
pointments.
The President and Senate might agree that a certain person
should be appointed even though she does not meet the prescribed
statutory qualifications, while the House of Representatives disagrees
and does not like the candidate. In that situation, the House of Rep-
resentatives would have the ability to block the appointment of a per-
son nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate by re-
fusing to amend the statutory qualifications. This is manifestly not
the process created by the Constitution, which does not give the
House of Representatives any power to reject nominees for federal
office.
This type of appointments scheme runs into a more widely recog-
nized constitutional problem-it effectively transfers de facto ap-
pointment power to Congress instead of the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. 9" Since the statute limits the number of
people able to be appointed (short of amending the statute) to effec-
tively zero, it constrains the appointment power of the President too
much.' 97 In any case, Congress has shown no interest in limiting ap-
pointments in this manner. The Senate has no institutional interest
in passing legislation that gives the House of Representatives an equal
role in confirming nominees. The example is intended merely to il-
lustrate the fact that statutory qualifications, even modest ones, can
lead to confirmation by both houses, as occurred in the Charlene
Barshefsky case.
Statutory qualifications create the possibility of officers being con-
firmed by both the House and Senate. They also create the more dis-
tressing possibility of officers being confirmed by the Senate but
blocked by the House of Representatives. Both possibilities are con-
196 The transfer of de facto appointment power is even clearer if Congress purports to vest the
appointment, but imposes qualifications that limit the pool of potential appointees to
zero or close to zero. In that case, Congress would have effectively created a new ap-
pointment method not authorized by the Constitution-for instance, appointment by the
head of a department by and with the advice and consent of both houses of Congress.
This illustrates the importance of a balancing test for statutory qualifications in vested
appointments. The power to select officers must remain substantially with one of the
constitutionally authorized appointers.
197 See Civil Service Commission, supra note 39.
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trary to the system set up in the Constitution, which requires confir-
mation only by the Senate.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution prohibits statutory qualifications for confirma-
tion appointments, but allows them for vested appointments. This
conclusion is apparent from a straightforward reading of the text of
the Appointments Clause. Congress cannot place statutory qualifica-
tions for officers appointed through the confirmation appointments
process simply because Congress as a whole has no role in that proc-
ess. Instead, the current Senate must give its advice and consent to
an individual after that person is nominated by the President.
The history and structure of the Constitution also support this
view. The Framers were reluctant to give the House of Representa-
tives a role in appointments because they thought the House was too
large to perform this task responsibly. The existence of statutory
qualifications also reduces the level of accountability the President
and Senate have when appointing officers.
For vested appointments, the situation is quite different. The
Constitution does give Congress as a whole a role to play in authoriz-
ing vested appointments of officers. The text indicates that statutory
qualifications for those officers are permissible. Additionally, there
are good structural reasons for allowing statutory qualifications in
cases of vested appointments-because the Senate does not provide a
check on the appointing power in those appointments, statutory
qualifications can provide the check instead.
The President and Senate should exercise their appointment re-
sponsibilities with great care. Senate confirmation should not be a
rubber stamp for appointment of the President's nominees. While
the qualifications that are often included in statutes for confirmation
appointments are often sensible ones, the President and Senate must
decide for themselves whether each individual nominee is qualified
for the office in question. If the nominee is qualified, a statutory re-
striction might stand in the way. If the nominee is not qualified, a
statutory restriction could allow them to look the other way and not
accept responsibility for the bad choice of officer. The processes cre-
ated by the Constitution were carefully considered by the Framers
and should be followed.
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